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Abstract 
Most malaria-endemic countries have struggled in the past decade to establish effective national-scale continuous 
distribution mechanisms for long-lasting insecticidal nets (LLINs). Since the implementation of the Tanzania National 
Voucher Scheme in 2004 and mass-distribution campaigns in 2009–2011 and 2015–2016, Tanzania has been commit-
ted to finding new and innovative ways of achieving and maintaining universal bed net coverage. Planning for the 
School Net Programme (SNP) began in 2011 and in 2013, the country piloted a SNP in three regions. Nets were dis-
tributed annually to children attending schools in selected primary and secondary grades. Intra-family re-distribution 
was assumed, and hence the family as a whole, rather than just the children themselves, were the targeted beneficiar-
ies. The programme has since expanded to 14 regions and has seen six rounds of annual distribution. In its fifth year, 
3 million nets were distributed at a cost of USD 3.64 per net and USD 0.60 per person-year of protection (including 
the net). ITN access and use were maintained at a high level (~ 50–75%) over the first 4 years of distribution within 
selected evaluation areas, even in the absence of a mass distribution event. Net distribution through primary schools 
has proven to be a feasible and effective strategy for maintaining consistently high coverage in Tanzania.
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Background
Most malaria-endemic countries in sub-Saharan Africa 
implement mass insecticide-treated net (ITN) distribu-
tion campaigns every 3 years to achieve high ITN access, 
but few have established effective national-scale continu-
ous distribution mechanisms capable of maintaining ITN 
coverage between mass campaigns or sustaining cover-
age in the absence of campaigns. Since the implementa-
tion of the Tanzania National Voucher Scheme (TNVS) 
in 2004, Tanzania has been committed to finding new 
and innovative ways of achieving and maintaining uni-
versal bed net coverage. To this end, the country piloted 
a School Net Programme (SNP) in three regions starting 
in 2013.
To date, Tanzania and Ghana are the only two countries 
that have implemented a school net programme on a 
large scale. The Tanzanian school net experience is nota-
ble because of its long duration, large scale and its promi-
nence in the National Malaria Strategic Plan. In order to 
document this experience, this case study reviews the 
planning process, implementation, results and lessons 
learned over nearly a decade of ‘keep-up’ implementation 
with school nets.
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Bed net distribution in Tanzania prior to the SNP
Between 2009 and 2011, two mass long-lasting insec-
ticide-treated bed net (LLIN) distribution campaigns 
were implemented in Tanzania with the goal of achieving 
nationwide universal coverage: the under-five catch-up 
campaign (U5CC) and the universal coverage campaign 
(UCC). The two campaigns distributed approximately 27 
million LLINs, leading to significant increases in owner-
ship and usage within households [1].
According to the Consensus Statement of the Roll 
Back Malaria Vector Control Working Group (VCWG), 
mass campaigns, which allow countries to rapidly reach 
universal coverage represent a “catch-up” strategy, while 
strategies which steadily introduce new nets to main-
tain high ITN access levels after a campaign are defined 
as “continuous distribution” [2]. Continuous distribution 
strategies are necessary because nets typically last only 
two to 3 years in the field, and these lost or worn-out nets 
need to be replaced to avoid loss of protection. This case 
study discusses the planning and implementation of an 
innovative ‘keep-up’ strategy in Tanzania relying on the 
continuous distribution of LLINs through primary and 
secondary public schools.
In 2004, Tanzania introduced the first innovative 
national routine ITN distribution strategy, the Tanzania 
National Voucher Scheme (TNVS), funded by the first 
grant round of the Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculo-
sis and Malaria. The TNVS aimed specifically to protect 
pregnant women (from 2004 onward) and infants (from 
2007 onward) with targeted LLIN distribution [3–10]. 
Pregnant women and mothers of infants received vouch-
ers during clinic visits for antenatal care and measles vac-
cination. These vouchers were then redeemed for nets at 
reduced price at participating retailers. The TNVS was 
discontinued in July 2014 when funding was withdrawn 
after a donor audit showed serious instances of fraud in 
some settings using an e-voucher system [11]. As it tar-
geted only pregnant women and infants, the TNVS alone 
could not provide enough nets annually to maintain uni-
versal coverage.
After the cessation of the TNVS in 2014, there was a 
two-year gap before distribution of free LLINs through 
routine ante-natal care (ANC) and the Expanded Pro-
gramme on Immunization (EPI) was instated. Between 
May 2016 and April 2017, USAID partners distributed 
nearly 800,000 LLINs through routine health facility-
based distribution channels, scaling up on a regional 
basis and reaching national scale in 2018. The project 
began with a “Smart Push” strategy in which each health 
facility received an initial 6-month supply of LLINs. The 
numbers that each facility received were planned based 
on patient volume data. Following the “Smart-Push,” 
facilities report quarterly on the number of nets they dis-
tributed and are re-stocked accordingly. The nets were 
given free-of-charge to pregnant women at their first 
antenatal care visit, and to children under five when they 
receive their nine-month measles vaccination.
The history of major bed net distributions in main-
land Tanzania since 2004 is shown in Fig. 1. Mass cam-
paigns were first conducted in 2009–2011 (U5CC and 
UCC), and then again nationally and in non-SNP regions 
in 2015–2016. Finally, the different school net distribu-
tions (described in the following section) are also shown. 
Before 2004, when this timeline starts, Tanzania already 
had significant experience with social marketing for ITN, 
including the KINET, SMITN and SMARTNET projects, 
and has had a commercial market for bed nets going back 
to at least the 1990s.
Development of the school net programme
Inception and design
After the mass campaigns of 2009 and 2011, it was widely 
recognized by stakeholders within mainland Tanzania 
that in order to maintain universal coverage, additional 
‘keep-up’ strategies were needed. To this end, stakeholder 
meetings were held in June of 2011 in Dar es Salaam, 
Fig. 1 Timeline of LLIN distribution in mainland Tanzania from 2004 through 2018
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Morogoro, Mtwara, Mwanza and Arusha to elicit input 
on the operational feasibility of a range of options for 
additional ‘keep-up’ channels, and to identify potential 
bottlenecks and barriers to successful implementation 
at both government and community levels [12]. It was 
hoped that the strategy would accomplish the following: 
(1) maintain population use of LLINs at 80% or more, (2) 
be equitable in terms of access to LLINs, (3) have mini-
mal geographic and temporal gaps in coverage, (4) not 
oversupply nets to households or be excessively costly 
and burdensome to manage and administer. It would 
also put some degree of responsibility on households to 
acquire nets, either through effort (e.g. travel, self-reg-
istration) or through paying a small portion of the cost 
of the net, as was done through the TNVS. The system 
would also encourage fair competition among manufac-
turers to improve quality and reduce costs. In an ideal 
system, a choice of nets (in terms of size, fabric, and col-
our) would also be available to the consumer [12].
In order to leverage the TNVS platform, distribution 
of vouchers for free or highly reduced price LLINs to 
school children in primary and secondary public schools 
in combination with the TNVS was identified as the best 
strategy to maintain universal coverage over a range of 
other options [12]. At the time, enrollment in primary 
school in Tanzania was generally high, with all but two 
regions reporting net enrollment rates greater than 90% 
[13]. Roughly 30% of the population of the country was 
between five and 15 years of age and was thus eligible for 
primary school enrollment and at least 62% of house-
holds had current resident of primary school age [12, 14]. 
Stakeholder discussions confirmed that beneficiary iden-
tification was clear and simple as only students enrolled 
in school would be eligible. It was assumed that teachers 
and school health officials could capably facilitate dis-
tribution and monitoring. Stakeholders noted that since 
households already needed to pay for school fees and uni-
forms at the beginning of the school year that the addi-
tional expense of an ITN through a subsidized voucher 
with co-payment could pose a barrier to school enroll-
ment and might be expected to reduce voucher redemp-
tion rates. On the other hand, receipt of vouchers could 
incentivize enrollment and thus potentially boost enroll-
ment levels. Ultimately, only the alternative with free net 
distribution was piloted and eventually expanded. After 
the TNVS was discontinued, use of a voucher-based SNP 
was no longer considered a short-term viable approach 
and a SNP with direct distribution of ITN to school chil-
dren was piloted instead. Decisions regarding the design, 
scope and scale of the pilot programme were made by the 
Tanzania NMCP, especially the ITN cell embedded in the 
NMCP, and supported by the Swiss Agency for Devel-
opment and Cooperation (SDC) in collaboration with 
donor partners and based in part on the results of the 
initial projections and results of the multi-stakeholder 
collaboration meetings detailed in Koenker et  al. [12]. 
During the initial planning that resulted in the SNP, pro-
jections for the full keep up system (combined TNVS and 
School Nets) only considered the voucher-based SNP 
option [12]. Therefore, we retrospectively consider these 
as the projections of cost and coverage for the SNP [12]. 
The School Net Programme was formed as a programme 
for free LLIN distribution annually to targeted house-
holds with school children as last-mile distributors. The 
attractiveness of the school net distribution strategy was 
that (1) it has a very clear and simple identification strat-
egy, (2) the potential to reach 85% of the population when 
combined with the TNVS (which was expected to only 
reach 45%), and (3) that it could be clearly monitored.
Pilot testing and expansion
The School Net Programme (SNP) was piloted in 2013 in 
Southern Tanzania (Lindi, Mtwara, and Ruvuma regions) 
by the Ministry of Health, Community Development, 
Gender, Elderly and Children (MoH-CDGEC) in part-
nership with the Ministry of Education and Vocational 
Training (MoEVT), Funding came from the U.S. Presi-
dent’s Malaria Initiative (PMI) through the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID) and the 
SDC. Further rounds of issuing LLINs within the SNP 
were funded by USAID/PMI, and implemented by a con-
sortium of partners that varied over time (including: RTI 
International, Tanzania Red Cross Society, PSI, JHUCCP) 
and was led by the National Malaria Control Programme 
(NMCP) with support from the Swiss Tropical and Pub-
lic Health Institute and SDC support. To date, the SNP 
has been rolled out over six annual rounds (SNP1-6) in a 
step-wise fashion across 14 regions of Tanzania (Fig. 2). 
The first three rounds of the SNP occurred in the three 
regions of Lindi, Mtwara, and Ruvuma (SNP Area A). 
The SNP expanded beginning with round four adding the 
four regions of Mwanza, Mara, Kagera and Geita (SNP 
Area B). In round five, the SNP was expanded again to 
add the seven regions of Katavi, Kigoma, Morogoro, 
Pwani, Shinyanga, Simiyu, and Tabora (SNP Area C).
In the SNP, one LLIN was distributed to each child 
enrolled in an eligible grade (originally primary 
and secondary school students). When the children 
received a net, they were told to bring it home and that 
it should be used according to needs in the household. 
They were also told that they may give the net to some-
one else who needed the net if it was not required in 
their household. Grade eligibility differed between 
rounds and regions. It was determined by the NMCP 
based on annual estimation of both needs for LLINs 
and resource availability. Broadly, SNP1-3 delivered 
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ITNs to four to six classes each year. Regions that had 
received the 2015–16 mass campaign and then began 
school distribution in SNP4 or SNP5 had one to four 
targeted classes in their first year—with more classes 
the longer the time elapsed since the most recent mass 
distribution campaign.
After SNP2, distributing nets to secondary schools 
was not deemed a strategic priority due to the low 
enrollment rates in secondary schools, and so distri-
bution was limited to primary school students from 
SNP3 forward. Enrollment levels in secondary schools 
in Tanzania are low relative to primary schools and 
may have decreased in recent years. During the same 
time, primary age enrollment increased from 85.7% to 
91.3%, most notably after the Government of Tanzania 
abolished primary school fees for the 2017 school year, 
prior to SNP5.
Projection of coverage and cost
At the time of the initial planning of the SNP programme, 
predicted net ownership and usage levels were modelled 
using the NetCALC software developed on a Microsoft 
Excel platform. The version used for the original model-
ling is now obsolete but updated versions remain avail-
able (https ://www.vecto r-works .org/resou rces/netca 
lc-plann ing-tool/). Cost modelling, conducted during 
planning, used data from various sources, including the 
NMCP of Tanzania, published literature, and financial 
records and reports of implementing partners of the 
NMCP to predict the future financial cost of the planned 
net distribution programme and other options. Com-
modity costs for nets were assumed not to vary over time. 
The costs of voucher distribution for school distribution 
were assumed to be similar to those under the TNVS at 
that time. Distribution of nets freely directly to students 
rather than through the use of a voucher assumed the 
Fig. 2 Map of SNP implementation areas
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same costs as had been achieved in past campaign distri-
butions [12].
The original coverage and use modelling assumed that 
approximately 73% of households, representing 85% of 
the population, included a currently pregnant woman, 
an infant (under 1  year) or a current student [14]. A 
that time, there were approximately 8.4 million primary 
school enrollees in Tanzania during the 2010 academic 
year.
Delivery of school net vouchers to 90% of primary 
school enrollees with an 80% redemption rate was 
expected to result in the delivery of approximately 6.2 
million LLINs per year into households in Tanzania, fall-
ing short of total net replacement need estimated at 7.9 
million LLINs per year [12]. Modelling the delivery via 
vouchers to all primary school students each year was 
estimated to require 56.7 million LLINs over 10 years at 
a total cost of $389 million, resulting in 73% of all per-
son-years protected (proportion of person-years at risk 
in which consistent ITN use was expected to occur) with 
a cost of $1.32 per person-year-protected (PYP). If free 
nets were provided instead, due to slight gains in delivery 
success, a need of 67.3 million LLINs was estimated at a 
total cost of $466 million, resulting in 83% of all person-
years protected at a cost of $1.41 per person-year pro-
tected (all costs are inclusive of the costs of the nets).
In 2013, a combination of the TNVS (targeting 
pregnant women and infants) and LLIN distribution 
through schools was thought to be an attractive combi-
nation of ‘keep-up’ mechanisms to reach the yearly net 
replacement need of 7.9 million LLINs. Roughly 9% of 
households had one to three children between the ages 
of one and five, and thus would have recently been eligi-
ble for the TNVS within recent years. These households 
would also be expected to move into the targeted cat-
egory for SNP as the children reached school age. This 
left about 18% of households untargeted by the combi-
nation strategy, even over a multi-year window. Hence, 
this work provided the basis for assuming that a very 
substantial part of the population could be reached via 
the SNP.
Figure  3 illustrates the modelled combination of the 
TNVS with school net vouchers distributed each year in 
Standards one, three, five, and seven (primary school) 
and Forms one and four (secondary school), which was 
the scenario most similar in the planning phase to what 
was actually implemented in Tanzania during SNP1. 
Targeting pregnant women and infants through the 
TNVS and students in these selected school grades was 
expected to lead to sustained use of ITNs by the popu-
lation as a whole at about 82%. Over ten years the com-
bination of TNVS plus school net voucher distribution 
was estimated to require 65.4 million LLINs at a total 
cost of USD 449 million for the entire country, and was 
predicted to protect 82% of total person-years at risk, at 
a cost per PYP of USD 1.34, and a per net cost of USD 
6.87 (including the net itself ).
Fig. 3 Projections for the combination of TNVS and school voucher distribution [12]. The years 2009–2011 show a rapid increase in use due to the 
modelled effect of the mass distribution carried out in that period
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Performance of the ‘keep‑up’ strategy
Coverage
To evaluate the coverage achieved by the SNP, annual 
rounds of a household survey were carried out in four 
districts of Tanzania, beginning in 2013. Two Southern 
districts, Mtwara Urban and Nachingwea, were located 
in the pilot regions and made up the intervention arm 
of the evaluation (SNP Area A in Fig. 2). The other two 
districts, Chato and Sengerema, were initially located in 
non-implementing Lake regions and were thus intended 
to make up the control arm of the evaluation (SNP Area 
B in Fig. 2). However, after the second survey round, the 
second UCC was rolled out in the control areas. Further, 
the SNP was expanded to include the control districts 
after the third survey round. Details of the evaluation are 
published in additional manuscripts [15] (Stuck, pers. 
commun.).
Ownership, access, and use
During a 4-year evaluation of the programme, owner-
ship, access, and use indicators were maintained or even 
increased from baseline levels within intervention dis-
tricts (Fig.  4) (Stuck, pers. commun.). Over the evalua-
tion period in Southern Tanzania, LLIN use in the total 
population increased from 44.9% (95% CI 40.5–49.3) to 
65.6% (95% CI 59.4–71.8; Fig. 5) based on measurements 
in two evaluation districts (Stuck, pers. commun.). While 
the final use estimate fell short of the projected 80%, the 
starting point was much lower than anticipated (~ 45% 
actual vs > 80% anticipated). Several factors likely led to 
Fig. 4 Household ownership of one (any bed net and LLIN), one LLIN per two persons, and population access to LLIN as measured in four 
household surveys. Non-SNP Evaluation estimates represent samples in areas with no SNP before the first three surveys (but a mass coverage 
campaign between survey rounds 2 & 3), while SNP Evaluation Districts estimates represent areas with full SNP rounds implemented prior to each 
survey. Dashed lines show time periods within the non-SNP evaluation districts prior to roll out of SNP in these districts
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the discrepancy between predicted use and actual use. 
One primary factor was the delay in implementation of 
the SNP after the first UCC campaign, which was imple-
mented in the Southern Zone in 2010. While original 
modelling expected the SNP to begin in the following 
year, the SNP did not start until the third year after the 
campaign, when the availability of nets in the three tar-
geted Southern regions had already fallen dramatically. 
Secondly, the discontinuation of the TNVS in 2014 and a 
two-year delay in the resumption of routine distribution 
through ANC/EPI also resulted in significantly fewer nets 
than expected being delivered in the targeted southern 
regions. A third important factor was that initial model-
ling assumed that the median LLIN half-life was 3 years, 
which was a common assumption at the time. Current 
information based on rigorous field studies suggests that 
median half-life for LLINs in mainland Tanzania is closer 
to 2  years [16]. This longer lifetime assumption results 
in dramatically higher coverage predictions than would 
have resulted from using the Tanzania-specific, shorter 
estimates that are now available. Finally, the modelling 
method at the time utilized a simple assumption that use 
would be approximately seven percentage points lower 
than ownership of at least one LLIN. As it turned out, on 
average in Tanzania, there were 7–11 percentage points 
between population level access and individual use at the 
national level over the past four MIS/DHS surveys, but 
17–22 percentage points between household ownership 
of any ITN and individual ITN use. Since this time, many 
additional analyses of the relationship between net use, 
ownership and access have been conducted, showing that 
population ITN access is a better indicator of ITN “cov-
erage”, and that net use is more accurately modelled in 
relation to population access [17, 18]. Nonetheless, by the 
end of the SNP evaluation, net use indicators had been 
at least maintained, if not increased, from their baseline 
levels as was part of the primary original goal of the SNP.
Reach of the SNP (household level eligibility and enrollment)
Over the four evaluation rounds, an average of 61.9% 
(95% CI 59.0%, 65.0%) of all households housed a primary 
or secondary school-aged child and 40.0% (95% CI 37.2%, 
43.0%) of all households housed a child enrolled in an eli-
gible grade. By the end of the evaluation, 52.5% (95% CI 
Fig. 5 Observed ITN use vs projected ITN use from original NetCALC Model [12] (Stuck pers. commun.). Dotted red lines shows non-SNP districts 
before SNP was expanded to include them. A mass campaign was conducted in the non-SNP areas between Survey Rounds 2 and 3
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48.3–56.7) of households owned at least one net obtained 
from the SNP. Pooling the data across all four rounds, 
34.0% (95% CI 30.7%, 37.4%) of all surveyed households 
in SNP areas owned a net distributed through the SNP 
during the previous SNP round (42.2% of the surveyed 
population of these areas lived in a house with a SNP net 
obtained during the previous SNP round). This result 
indicates that each round of the SNP reached approxi-
mately one of every three households, but that different 
households were reached each year.
From SNP1 onward, Social and Behaviour Change 
Communication (SBCC) activities were intentionally 
designed to encourage families to give extra nets to rela-
tives or neighbours to improve equity of ITN access. 
Gifting of SNP nets outside a given household was 
uncommon immediately after the first distribution (0.9% 
of all SNP nets) but increased to 15.4% of all SNP nets by 
the fourth round of distribution. With time and support-
ive communication, this process could potentially repre-
sent a pathway by which the SNP could reach non-target 
households.
Cost
SNP
Formal costing following standard practices was con-
ducted during the third and fifth rounds of SNP dis-
tribution [19]. SNP3 delivered nearly 500,000 LLINs 
through schools in three regions at a cost of 9.48 USD 
per net distributed (1.58 USD per PYP) and SNP5 deliv-
ered slightly more than three million LLINs through 
schools in 14 regions at an economic cost of USD 3.64 
per net distributed (USD 0.60 per PYP) in 2017 (includ-
ing the price of the net). Of the total costs, approximately 
USD 5.96 was for distribution and the remainder (USD 
3.52) related to the cost of the net itself in SNP3, while 
approximately USD 1.58 was for distribution and the 
remainder (USD 2.06) related to the cost of the net itself 
in SNP5. For both SNP3 and SNP5, the most significant 
cost driver in financial terms was the price of LLINs, 
though LLINs accounted for less than 50% of total cost 
in SNP3. The second most important cost drivers were 
the expenditures on personnel and fringe, school data 
quantification and validation, and supervision for SNP3 
distribution and net transport and personnel and fringe 
for SNP5 distribution. The economic cost per net distrib-
uted in SNP5 was substantially lower than SNP3, largely 
due to cost-cutting measures introduced at the national 
and local levels. From SNP3 to SNP5 there was a signifi-
cant shift of focus from local government level to higher-
level engagement by obtaining student enrollment data 
from the central government and working closely with 
national-level representation to develop new tools. At 
the same time, data collection and reporting within the 
central government was strengthened and incorporated 
into SNP5 by utilizing existing infrastructure such as 
the Basic Education Management Information System 
(BEMIS). Projections for the combined TNVS/school 
voucher programme indicated that 65.4 million LLINs 
would be distributed at a cost per PYP of USD 1.34, and a 
per-net cost of USD 6.87 (including the price of the net). 
SNP3 delivered nets at a higher cost per net and per PYP 
than was initially predicted, by SNP5 much lower costs 
per net and cost per PYP than original projections were 
being achieved [12]. Given that the later rounds of SNP 
delivered substantially more LLINs than the early rounds 
and at a lower cost, the total cost of the programme over 
a ten-year period would be expected to be much lower 
than initially projected due to a combination of falling 
commodity costs for LLIN and more efficient distribu-
tion. Further gains might be made if distribution costs 
could be further reduced; as newer more expensive ITNs 
come online such gains may be necessary to contain costs 
at recent levels.
ANC/EPI distribution
The costs of routine distribution had originally been 
assessed in the TNVS prior to the roll-out of the SNP, 
and predictions of the cost of the TNVS during the SNP 
intervention were based on this [7]. The TNVS was dis-
continued in 2014 and by 2016/17 this element of the 
‘keep-up’ strategy was replaced by routine free distribu-
tion of LLIN at ANC/EPI clinics. A formal economic and 
financial costing of the ANC/EPI distribution was con-
ducted in 2018 and estimated the financial cost per ITN 
distributed through ANC/EPI to be USD 6.04 per net, 
not including domestic government contributions (such 
as ANC/EPI clinic staff salaries and storage space), and 
USD 7.50 when these were included. These translated 
into a cost of approximately USD 1.25 per person-year 
of protection which is similar but slightly lower than the 
prediction from the original planning period (all costs 
include the cost of the net).
Challenges and lessons learned
Weaknesses in design
Gaps in reach. Excluding secondary school students from 
the targeted population after SNP2 meant that house-
holds with only older children (in addition to those with 
none) were no longer reached by either SNP or ANC/EPI 
distribution—except through the relatively uncommon 
event of inter-household redistribution of nets. These 
included households with older adults whose children 
had grown past school age, households made up of young 
families who did not yet had children, and single or 
transitory workers living in shared housing. While such 
households were likely to benefit from the community 
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effects of nets given the high levels of usage and owner-
ship in SNP areas, questions of equity and reach need 
to be considered. Tanzania’s current National Strategic 
Plan has a commercial sector component intended to 
boost ITN sales so that all households would be able to 
purchase an ITN when they need a new one, but unfor-
tunately, most purchased nets are untreated [20]. As the 
programme expands, it will be critical to determine if 
local variation in school enrollment will result in com-
promised coverage effects in some parts of the country, 
and whether varying the number of targeted classes will 
be able to mitigate this.
Overestimate of net lifetime. While predictions of cost 
per person-year of protection and per net distributed 
from before the initiation of the SNP were relatively accu-
rate, predictions of use and ownership were somewhat 
optimistic. One important reason for overestimation was 
a reliance on an overly optimistic estimate of net life-
time. The lower observed coverage highlights the impor-
tance of, at a minimum, gaining a better understanding 
of LLIN lifetimes to drive procurement quantifications 
and plan for future distribution to reach pre-determined 
coverage targets. Overly pessimistic estimates of net life-
time will lead to oversupply of nets while overly optimis-
tic assumptions will result in insufficient coverage and 
potentially insufficient protection.
Challenges in implementation
Timing of first SNP and interruption in routine delivery. 
The TNVS ended in July 2014 after an audit uncovered 
fraudulent activities by health facility staff, retail out-
lets, and sales representatives [11]. After a two-year gap 
in distribution targeted at pregnant women and infants, 
distribution to these populations was slowly reinstated 
via free LLIN distribution through ANC and EPI. This 
gap in routine delivery led to significant undersupply of 
nets when compared to original planning for the SNP in 
2011. Likewise, the 2011 Keep Up Strategy projected SNP 
to begin in 2012, while it did not start until mid-2013, 
nearly 3 years after the last mass campaign in the three 
targeted southern regions.
Large number of distribution points. The large number 
of schools and hence distribution points for the SNP 
posed a major operational challenge. The project began 
with 2337 primary and secondary school distribution 
points and expanded to 9535 primary school distribu-
tion points across the 14 targeted regions by the fifth 
round of SNP. The operational scope is similar to mass 
campaigns, which had 2668 distribution points in the 
2010-2011 UCC in the three originally targeted south-
ern regions, and 11,717 issuing points for the UCC in 
the 14 regions currently targeted for SNP. SNP shared 
some operational challenges with other large-scale net 
distributions, such as identifying the optimal cascade 
training design, having consistent cellular network 
service to facilitate mobile-money payments for train-
ees and supervisors, and data entry errors and delay as 
reports were aggregated. Sensitization meetings with 
local officials and trainings for various actors were rel-
atively intense in the first rounds; these were reduced 
or eliminated entirely in subsequent rounds as the pro-
gramme became institutionalized.
During SNP1, LLINs were stored for several days so 
that all schools could distribute nets on the same day, 
region-wide; this was eliminated in later rounds to avoid 
storage and security costs. LLINs were given to teachers 
in targeted classes in SNP1. This practice, along with pay-
ing allowances for issuing and reporting, was eliminated 
in later rounds as the time involved was minimal and 
recognized as part of teachers’ job duties. Ward Educa-
tion Coordinators (WECs) initially visited schools to 
collect enrollment data, which was cumbersome to man-
age. School data validation visits were employed in SNP2 
and SNP3, but eliminated, along with the WEC role, for 
SNP4 when the President’s Office Regional Administra-
tion and Local Government offices (PO-RALG) estab-
lished the Basic Education Management Information 
System (BEMIS) to track enrollment data. Data from the 
BEMIS were used to establish LLIN quantifications and 
LLIN transport plans. Logistics were also streamlined 
over time-in the first rounds, LLINs were delivered to 
the district councils and re-bundled for separate onward 
transport to various schools. Switching to a ‘mobile ware-
house’ strategy where larger trucks dropped off nets at 
schools along pre-identified routes reduced costs, as did 
switching in SNP4 from offloading, storing, and reload-
ing at regional warehouses to a ‘cross-docking’ sys-
tem whereby LLINs were received virtually by regional 
authorities, but offloaded directly to the smaller ‘mobile 
warehouse’ trucks. Starting in SNP5, transport was done 
by a third-party private logistics firm, with delivery time-
frames and confirmations sent by SMS to district council 
officials and implementing partners. The ministry of local 
governments (PO-RALG) increased their involvement 
in the activity over time, given their oversight of local-
level health and education activities. As SNP expanded 
to additional regions, the timeframe of the annual activ-
ity lengthened. LLIN shipments were planned to arrive in 
two to three phases, scheduled around examination peri-
ods and vacations. In limited cases, deliveries occurred 
after exams when Standard 7 students had already left 
school. Timing distribution around holidays, national 
exam schedules and local events also poses a planning 
challenges, as school distributions must align well with 
school calendars which can vary significantly even within 
small areas.
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Acceptability to stakeholders and beneficiaries. The 
reactions of stakeholders and beneficiaries has been 
largely positive, with students and teachers generally 
looking forward to the SNP. In parallel, local government 
involvement and leadership has grown over time [21]. 
Through the planning discussions for SNP1-3, NCMP 
and PO-RALG centralized data and improved the sys-
tems, allowing both government and implementing part-
ners to access the data at a central level. As a result of 
this collaboration, the SNP helped PO-RALG formalize 
data management related to enrolment, hence offering 
an appreciated service. Since SNP4, the consensus was 
that work was easier—classes were preidentified with-
out costly and time-consuming visits to collect or verify 
data, and distribution occurred the same day nets were 
delivered. Others also felt that the programme reduced 
malaria cases in student populations. SNP has also led 
PO-RALG, the MoEVT and the MoH-CDGEC to coor-
dinate more closely, an important development towards 
multi-sectorial malaria control activities.
There are also ongoing concerns with some elements of 
the programme, especially with regards to groups that are 
missed by the SNP. This includes dissatisfaction among 
students enrolled in schools but not in eligible classes 
in a given year, especially those in the youngest classes 
and the pre-school classes (kindergarten classes). It also 
includes students enrolled in schools that may be missed 
because they are not part of the regular Ministry of Edu-
cation System, such as schools for students with special 
needs, which may not be identified through the regular 
school quantification system. Extra care must be taken in 
future SNP-like programmes to ensure that such schools 
are enumerated and included. In addition, in some early 
years, teachers were included as beneficiaries (hence they 
received a net), but in more recent years they have only 
been programme participants. The teachers repeatedly 
reported the desire to be included in the programme as 
beneficiaries [21].
Quantification of net needs. In addition to the original 
modelling that explored the theoretical framework for the 
SNP, for each SNP round, NetCALC was used to conduct 
quantification before net procurement and deployment. 
Several challenges and some lessons learned through this 
process have led to improvements in the overall quanti-
fication modelling process. The original NetCALC soft-
ware could only predict ownership of at least one net at 
the household level (though this was modified to also 
predict use for the initial SNP planning) [12]. Subsequent 
versions of the modelling software were updated to for-
mally predict ITN population access. During SNP1-3, 
ownership of any ITN was the target used during quan-
tification, while population ITN access was used to quan-
tify net needs after SNP4, resulting in better planning 
alignment with national strategic goals. Regardless of 
the target indicator used for quantification, net lifetime 
was an important parameter which needed considerable 
revising over time and still require local monitoring [16, 
17]. The use of an Excel-based tool limited options for an 
effective, error-free workflow and created opportunities 
for data entry error as the programme expanded in scope 
and became more complex. A NetCALC algorithm in 
software that is more reproducible has become available 
and may be useful moving forward [22]. Higher resolu-
tion data in time and space, such as was available due to 
routine evaluation was helpful for quantification, as LLIN 
needs could be locally recalibrated each year and the 
strategy adjusted based on these data [15]. This was espe-
cially true in the early rounds of SNP, when assumptions 
about the reach of the strategy were confronted with the 
realities of the three-year gap since the previous mass 
campaign and the discontinuation of the TNVS. Given 
the variations in enrolment by region, as well as differ-
ent starting years and starting levels of ITN access, good 
monitoring will continue to be important to track ITN 
access on a regional basis, gathering data, and adjusting 
net quantities to maintain high rates of ITN access.
Conclusion
The Tanzania School Net Programme was able to main-
tain LLIN ownership, access and use in the absence 
of a mass distribution over a period nearing a decade 
since the last mass campaign in three southern regions 
of Tanzania. LLIN population access in these areas was 
comparable to regions with recent mass distributions 
in the most recent nationwide surveys (70–80% in the 
2017 MIS). The SNP successfully reached households 
with school-age children but left a substantial number 
of households that did not have school-enrolled children 
without sufficient ITNs, thus requiring additional chan-
nels such as ANC/EPI for long-term coverage main-
tenance. A mechanism to reach households without 
children is still lacking leading a substantial portion of 
the population without a direct avenue to access ITNs.
Predictions of cost and coverage leading to the initial 
deployment of the SNP were relatively accurate but com-
promised by incomplete understandings of LLIN life-
times, late start of the pilot SNP, and limitations of the 
original NetCALC model. In addition, coverage was ini-
tially negatively impacted by the discontinuation of the 
TNVS in 2014, which had been factored into the original 
planning.
Despite these setbacks to the SNP, distributing LLINs 
through primary schools has proven to be a viable strat-
egy as an alternative to repeated mass campaigns in 
Tanzania and has thus been expanded to about half the 
country. Finally, the combination of the SNP with other 
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preventive measures, as defined in the National Malaria 
Strategic Plan, will require future assessment to under-
stand if they continue to serve the role of providing sus-
tainable LLIN coverage, reductions in malaria burden 
and progress towards a malaria free Tanzania.
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